In November 1992 I received instructions to represent Simeon Serafanowicz, who was at that time being investigated in relation to war crimes committed during the Second World War. On 12 July 1995, he became the first person to be charged under the War Crimes Act 1991, and I formally became the first person to be instructed to defend such a case.
The defendant faced a number of counts of murder, the victim in each case being identified simply as 'an unknown Jew'. The killings were part of the systematic annihilation of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe.
A number of questions were immediately raised. Did conducting the defence in such a case cause difficulties for a Jewish barrister? It was important from my perspective that I was not personally being used on account of my religion to assist the defendant. It should be noted that from start to finish the defendant seemed completely unaware of my religion, although it had been explained to him at the outset. Indeed, he was offered other counsel if he felt that I would be unable to adequately represent his interests. It might also be relevant to note that I am unaware of having lost any relative in the Holocaust.
What was my personal view about acting in such a case? Whilst I cannot pretend that it was no different from any other criminal case, the Code of Conduct for the Bar, which I have followed throughout my career, was quite clear. Having spoken to the Bar Council and several senior members of the Bar, I could see no reason not to act on Serafanowicz's behalf. Nevertheless, I was still subjected to a certain amount of personal attack and was the recipient of some 'hate' mail from time to time. It seemed to emanate from both sides of the divide -some from the extreme right wing, who were at pains to point out that the Holocaust never took place, and some from the Jewish community, who felt that I was betraying both those who died and my own heritage. Indeed, some members of the legal profession were less than supportive in their comments! It is worth including here a word or two about funding. No special measures in relation to Legal Aid were ever put in place to deal with such a case. I acted as sole counsel under a Legal Aid order in the ordinary way, carrying out vast amounts of preparation. Given that the Crown were represented by leading counsel and Treasury counsel with a large support team, and given the size of the case, I advised that leading counsel should be instructed on behalf of the defendant. That happened, and the immediate consequence was that I was no longer acting under a Legal Aid order, as the rules do not permit two counsel to appear at an old-style committal. I continued for some months, none the less, to act pro bono. Eventually Sir Edward Heath made representations to the Lord Chancellor on my behalf, and some funding arrangement was put in place.
Let me now turn to some of the more interesting issues raised by this case. Ever since it was first announced that such a prosecution was to take place, everybody I encountered seemed to offer their uninvited views on the topic. For the record, may I now set out what I see as some of the key questions and issues, although I can give only a small insight into many of the difficulties encountered. 1. Should those persons responsible for committing war crimes be prosecuted? The answer in broad terms must, of course, be yes. Do the same considerations apply to crimes arising out ofthe former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and World War II? Again, in principle, I can see no reason why not. 2. Should a Statute of Limitation apply in such cases? Does there come a time when in reality it is too late to prosecute? It is under this heading that most people raised objection, but I cannot truly understand the argument. Frequently, for example, in child abuse cases, the victims of abuse only feel able to speak out after many years. Surely it cannot be thought that such cases should not take place. If, for example, Lord Lucan were to be found alive and well, is there any reason why he should not be put on trial? The authorities have always sought to bring him before a court. Perhaps the only difference in the Serafanowicz case is that between the time that he arrived in this country, shortly after the end of World War II, and the passing of the Act, nothing of consequence was done by the state to bring war criminals to trial. Never at any stage did Serafanowicz change his identity, and his name and phone number were always available. 3. Another controversial question is whether a person now resident in the United Kingdom can be prosecuted for offences committed outside the United Kingdom, at the time not even being a British citizen. Without rehearsing the many and complex legal arguments, we might ask whether those British citizens who travel abroad, to Thailand for example, to seek out sexual activity with minors might now be considered more actively for prosecution. 4. The age and the fitness of the defendant to stand trial is, of course, central. Was he able to understand and follow the evidence and able to give instructions? In this case the jury found that he was not. Age, of course, of itself cannot be a bar to prosecution. 5. Finally, I turn to what for me is the sole reason why prosecutions ofthis type should not take place. On occasions the British prosecuting authorities are dependent on co-operation from foreign countries. This is most frequently the case in cross-border drug movements. The British authorities are also dependent on those jurisdictions to enable their obligations, in relation to disclosure, to be fulfilled. Usually this presents little difficulty, but what is the position if the country concerned cannot be said to be democratic by any realistic standard expected in the UK? Having spent some time in Belorussia I am bound to say that I have little or no confidence that all the documents and archives requested were made available. Frequently, we were told that files had been closed, or were missing or had been moved. On one occasion the KGB indicated that they would provide documents we wished to inspect. We waited for some days and finally, just before we were due to depart, which they of course knew, we were told that the man we had been dealing with had gone on holiday. The files were never made available.
In the area where the crimes took place, we were constantly made to travel with a Belorussian prosecutor. Whenever we found a potential witness who indicated that he or she wanted to speak to us, the prosecutor's assistant attempted to frighten such witnesses away. Even after the passage of 50 years or more, many are still too frightened to speak on behalfof someone who was said to have carried out the instructions of the German occupiers. The reality is that life in the Belorussian countryside has changed little over the years.
The more that I saw, the more I became convinced that the truth of what really happened would never be told. No trial, in my view, could take place which would approach the British standard. Consequently, I am compelled to conclude that these trials should not take place. I, of course, realize that this personal view is not shared by all. If we want to remember the Holocaust, and we must, this is not the way to perpetuate that memory.
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